We use China's large-scale reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the late 1990s as a natural experiment to identify and quantify the importance of precautionary saving for wealth accumulation. Before the reform, SOE workers enjoyed similar job security as government employees. Since the reform, over 35 million SOE workers have been laid off, although government employees kept their "iron rice bowl." The change in unemployment risk for SOE workers relative to that of government employees before and after the reform provides a clean identification of income uncertainty that helps us estimate the importance of precautionary saving. In our estimation, we correct a self-selection bias in occupational choice and disentangle the effects of uncertainty from pessimistic outlook. We obtain evidence that precautionary savings account for about 30 percent of the wealth accumulation for SOE workers between 1995 and 2002. . For helpful comments and suggestions, we are grateful to
I. Introduction
China has experienced rapid economic growth in the past two decades. During the same period, the household saving rate has increased substantially. These observations appear to contradict the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) theory, which suggests that expected increases in wealth should result in households borrowing now to smooth consumption, rather than saving. Yet the Chinese data show the opposite pattern. 1 One plausible explanation for the rising saving rate in China is precautionary saving. As the country goes through a transition from a central planning system to a market-oriented economy, large structural changes associated with policy reforms may lead to increases in economic uncertainty. All else equal, higher income uncertainty leads to more precautionary savings.
In practice, however, it is challenging to identify and quantify the importance of precautionary saving in the data. In particular, it is difficult to clearly identify observable and exogenous sources of income risks that vary significantly across households (Lusardi, 1998; Carroll and Kimball, 2006) . Many studies use the cross-sectional variance of income as a proxy for income uncertainty (Carroll and Samwick, 1998) . But this proxy may be subject to measurement errors and potential endogeneity bias (Kennickell and Lusardi, 2005) .
To quantify the importance of precautionary saving also requires correcting a self-selection bias. Theory implies that precautionary wealth accumulation depends not just on risk, but also on risk preferences (Caballero, 1990 (Caballero, , 1991 ). An individual with high risk aversion has an incentive to choose a job with low income risk. Similarly, a worker with low risk aversion may want to choose a job with high income risk (with potentially high expected income).
Failing to control for self-selection in occupational choices may lead to a significant downward bias in estimating the importance of precautionary saving (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005) .
Partly reflecting the difficulties in measuring income uncertainty and correcting selfselection biases, the existing literature obtains mixed evidence of precautionary saving. For example, some studies report weak or no evidence of precautionary saving (Skinner, 1988; Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese, 1992) , while some other studies attribute up to 50 percent of household wealth accumulation to precautionary saving (Carroll and Samwick, 1998) .
In this paper, we present a new approach to identifying and quantifying the contribution of precautionary saving to wealth accumulation. We use the large-scale reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China in the late 1990s as a natural experiment to achieve identification. Before the reform, workers in SOEs and in the government sector (GOV) had similar 1 Empirical studies find mixed evidence for the PIH theory using Chinese data. See, for example, Modigliani and Cao (2004) and Horioka and Wan (2007) . job security, including guaranteed pensions and near-free health care and housing. In this sense, workers in both sectors held an "iron rice bowl" before the reform. After the reform, however, over 35 million workers in the SOEs were laid off between 1995 and 2002. Those workers lost not just their jobs, but also the associated benefits. In contrast, workers in the government sector-where few layoffs occurred-were little affected by the reform; they were able to hold on to their iron rice bowl. The massive layoffs in the SOEs significantly changed the perceived income risk for the remaining SOE workers. The reform was exogenous and largely unexpected to individual workers, and it created significant variations of unemployment risk for workers across the SOE and GOV sectors. Thus, the reform provides us with a clean identification of relative income risk and perceived job uncertainty.
To estimate the importance of precautionary saving, we use data from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) survey. We focus on the years 1995 and 2002. The large-scale SOE reform started to have significant impact on SOE employment in 1997, with the effects gradually phasing out by 2002. Our sample thus covers both the pre-and post-reform periods. To identify and quantify the contribution of precautionary saving to wealth accumulation, we exploit the differences in saving behavior both across sectors (SOE vs. GOV) and across time (before and after the SOE reform)-a difference-in-differences (DID) approach.
The time variations (between 1995 and 2002) of the relative saving behavior of workers in the two sectors capture the magnitude of precautionary saving stemming from the breaking of the iron rice bowl.
To control for self-selection biases that may arise from correlations between occupational choices and individual workers' risk attitude, we use an important feature of the CHIP survey.
The survey contains a question about how a worker obtained her current job. Some workers find jobs through a search and matching process; but in our sample, a majority of workers (over 70 percent) have jobs assigned by the government. For assigned jobs, the government has the final power to determine the worker's occupation and compensation. Thus, for those workers whose jobs are assigned by the government, the occupational choice is likely unrelated to worker preferences. We restrict our sample to include only those households whose jobs were assigned by the government. This restriction helps us control for the effects of self-selection in occupational choice.
The SOE reform might affect not only the perceptions of future income uncertainty, but also the expected future income growth rate. For example, after witnessing the impact of the reform on the relative job security, an SOE worker might expect not only an increase in future income risks but also a decline in future income levels. Declines in expected income would also raise current saving. Such saving behavior, however, is driven by the worker's desire for intertemporal consumption smoothing (i.e., the PIH effect), not by precautionary motives.
To isolate the effects of precautionary motives on saving from the PIH effects, we use a unique question in the 2002 CHIP survey that asks households about their expectations of income paths in the next five years. We restrict our sample to include only those workers who do not expect income to decline. This approach enables us to mitigate the effects of the PIH channel that could cause an upward bias in the estimation of precautionary saving.
By identifying job uncertainty caused by the SOE reform, correcting the self-selection bias in occupational choices, and controlling for PIH effects, we obtain estimates of precautionary savings that are significant both statistically and economically. We estimate that precautionary savings accounted for about 30 percent of total financial wealth accumulations for SOE workers during the period from 1995 to 2002.
II. Related Literature
Our work contributes to a growing literature that attempts to quantify the importance of precautionary saving for explaining China's rising saving rate. Earlier studies obtain mixed evidence that supports the precautionary-saving view (Kraay, 2000; Carroll, Dynan, and Krane, 2003; Meng, 2003) .
A more recent study by Chamon and Prasad (2010) uses the annual Chinese Urban Household Survey from 1995 to 2005 to disentangle different motives behind the rising urban household saving rate. Chamon and Prasad (2010) find that the increases in private burden of education, health and housing expenditures seem among the strongest candidates for explaining the increases in saving rates. Chamon, Liu, and Prasad (2013) document a sharp increase in income uncertainty associated with increases in transitory idiosyncratic shocks among Chinese urban households. They argue that rising income uncertainty induces younger households to raise their saving rate significantly.
An alternative explanation for the rising Chinese saving rate is provided by Wei and Zhang (2011) , who present evidence that sex imbalances caused by China's one-child policy have induced a "competitive savings motive": with a shortage of girls, parents with a son save more to increase the relative attractiveness of their son in a tighter marriage market. They show that this competitive savings motive is empirically important.
Our study builds on this literature. The main contribution of our paper is that we use the large-scale SOE reform in China as a natural experiment to clearly identify and quantify the importance of precautionary saving. In our estimation, we exploit the microeconomic details of the CHIP survey data to correct the self-selection bias in occupational choices and to disentangle the effects of uncertainty from pessimistic outlooks.
Our approach to correcting self-selection biases is complementary to that used by Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) , who use the event of the German reunification as a natural experiment to identify the presence of self selection. Before the reunification, civil servants in East Germany had government-assigned jobs, while civil servants in West Germany were free to choose their occupations (and they chose to work in the government). Therefore, the occupational choices for civil servants in East Germany were not subject to self-selection, but those in West Germany were. The reunification significantly increased income risks for all workers in the former East Germany but civil servants, most of whom were able to keep their jobs in the newly unified Germany. By comparing wealth accumulations of civil servants with those of individuals in other occupations between East and West Germany, they identify the effects of self-selection on precautionary saving. Our approach to controlling for self-selection biases is different. We focus our sample on workers whose jobs were assigned by the government. In our sample, about 83% of jobs were assigned by the government in 1995 and 72% in 2002. For assigned jobs, the government has the final power to determine the worker's occupation and compensation. Thus, for those workers whose jobs are assigned by the government, the occupational choice is likely unrelated to the risk attitudes of individual workers. Despite the differences in approach and the data set used, our results are similar to those obtained by Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) , both indicating that self-selection can cause a significant downward bias for estimating the quantitative importance of precautionary saving.
III. Some Background of the SOE Reform
From 1949 to 1978, China's economy was under a central-planning regime. The government maintained tight controls over production and factor allocations. Most jobs were assigned by the government. To support the goal of industrialization, workers were paid subsistence wages and, in exchange, they were guaranteed life-time employment along with near-free housing, education, health care, and pension (Cai, Park, and Zhao, 2008) . This cradle-to-grave regime is known as the "iron rice bowl," which has long been advocated as one advantage of China's socialist system.
The "open door" economic policy and nationwide reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s initiated China's transition to a free-market economy. In the mid-1980s, the government introduced a labor contract system, under which workers were permitted to search for jobs and employers gained some flexibility in hiring (Meng, 2000) . These reform policies led to a large-scale urban migration and increased competition facing SOEs. Following Deng Xiaoping's tour of the south in 1992, more liberalization policies were adopted by the government, leading to a boom in urban economies, which further intensified competition for SOEs. At that time, with soft budget constraints and the requirement to implement the government's goal of full-employment, the SOE sector had substantial redundant labor and many SOE firms were making losses. In 1995 and 1996, around 50% of the SOEs (mostly small or medium sized) reported losses (Meng, 2003) . The Asian financial crisis in 1997 exacerbated the situation.
The Chinese government was forced to take actions to improve efficiency of the SOEs and to stem losses. Specific actions were laid out at the Fifteenth Communist Party Congress held in September 1997. A central spirit of the restructuring policy was to "grasp the large and let go of the small." Large (and usually more profitable) SOEs in strategic sectors such as electricity, oil, raw materials, and telecommunications were corporatized and maintained under state controls, while smaller (and often loss-making) SOEs were either privatized or let go bankrupt (see Hsieh and Song (2013) ). These policy changes led to a massive layoff (xia gang in Chinese) of SOE workers starting in 1997, the scale of which was unprecedented.
In 1997, a cumulative of about 6.92 million SOE workers were laid off. The wave of layoffs reached a peak in 1999 and 2000, each year with over 6.5 million SOEs workers losing their jobs, and started to subside by 2002. During the 5-year period from 1997 to 2002, a remarkable total of 35.52 million SOE workers had been laid off (Cai, Park, and Zhao, 2008) .
There is evidence that the SOE layoffs were concentrated in small and loss-making firms and in some demographic groups. For example, females, less educated, less skilled, less healthy workers, and non-members of the communist party were more likely to be laid off than others. Workers in SOEs owned by local governments were also more likely to be laid off than those in SOEs owned by the central government (Appleton, Knight, Song, and Xia, 2002) . However, the scale and the breadth of the layoffs were largely unexpected by individual workers (see Appendix A for a case study of the SOE layoff experience). Thus, for the SOEs workers who were fortunate to keep their jobs, the reform that broke the iron rice bowl had led to significant changes in their perceptions about future job security and substantially increased their perceived income uncertainty.
IV. Data and Empirical Strategy
IV.1. Data. The data that we use are taken from Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) surveys. Those surveys were conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) through a series of questionnaire-based interviews done in rural and urban areas in China in 1988 China in , 1995 China in , 2002 China in and 2007 . The households in each survey are randomly selected following a strict sampling process so that they are nationally representative. The surveys cover a sample of about 15,000 to 20,000 households in about 10 provinces in China. The surveys contain detailed data on rural and urban households' economic status, employment, levels of education, sources of income, household compositions, household expenditures and wealth. The CHIP data have been frequently used in the empirical literature (e.g., Wei and Zhang 2011) .
In this paper, we focus on the 1995 and 2002 CHIP data since the time span covers the period of massive SOE layoffs associated with the SOE reform of the late 1990s. As we described in Section III, before the reform, workers in SOEs had similar life-long employment status as those in GOV sectors; in both sectors, workers faced little unemployment risks and income uncertainty. However, since the reform started in 1997, a large number of SOE workers were laid off while GOV workers were able to keep their iron rice bowl. The reform thus injected substantial unemployment risks to SOE workers relative to GOV workers. The different impact of the reform on workers across the two sectors provides an ideal "natural experiment" for us to identify precautionary saving due to a sudden and substantial increase in unemployment risks.
To estimate the quantitative importance of precautionary saving, we exploit changes in saving behaviors associated with the SOE reform between SOE workers and GOV workers.
Thus, we restrict our sample to include only those households whose heads work in either the SOE sector or the GOV sector. The SOE sector includes firms that are directly owned by the government (including central, provincial, and local governments), those in which the government holds a controlling share of stocks, and those under collective ownership. The GOV sector includes all levels of government and public institutions. 2 We further restrict our sample to include prime-age workers, whose ages are between 25 and 55 years. This choice is partly driven by concerns of measurement errors in wealth and permanent income for younger workers. It is also driven by concerns that the saving behaviors of workers close to retirement ages change dramatically for reasons more closely related to life-cycle factor than to income uncertainty (Carroll and Samwick, 1998; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002 however, the large-scale SOE reform has led to a substantial decline in the relative share of employment in the SOE sector from 70.5% to 42.4%. In contrast, the share of employment in the GOV sector has increased modestly.
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The normal retirement age for female workers in China is between 50 and 55; for male workers, it is between 55 and 60. Table 2 reports summary statistics of the full sample; and Table 3 compares some key characteristics between GOV and SOE workers.
To estimate the quantitative importance of precautionary saving, we focus on the empirical relation between a measure of savings and a measure of income uncertainty, while controlling for a few demographic characteristics.
We measure household saving behavior by the ratio of financial wealth to permanent income (i.e., the W/P ratio; see Table 1 for a description of these variables). 4 We use the stock of financial wealth reported in the surveys instead of the flow of saving or the saving rate to measure an individual's saving behavior for two reasons. First, unlike the flow of saving, financial wealth is not influenced by high-frequency fluctuations in income and expenditures. Thus, it is better able to capture long-run (or average) saving behavior in which we are interested. Second, financial wealth is a direct measure of cumulative savings and is thus less subject to measurement errors than the flow of saving or the saving rate, which are indirectly calculated based on income and consumption expenditures. Moreover, our measure of financial wealth includes mostly liquid assets, which are relevant for studying precautionary saving (Carroll and Samwick, 1998) .
We normalize financial wealth by permanent income to obtain a measure of average savings. We thus need to construct a measure of permanent income. In the CHIP datasets, survey participants report incomes earned by household heads during the current year and the recent past. In the 1995 survey, we observe household head earnings from 1990 to 1995;
in the 2002 survey, we observe earnings from 1998 to 2002. 5 We use this information to construct a measure of permanent income following a similar approach used by Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) . This is done in three steps. First, we calculate a household head's earnings relative to the average earnings of all households in each year with reported earnings. Second, we take the time-series average of the household relative earnings. Third, we multiply the household head's income in each of the survey years (1995 or 2002) For a single-earner family, the household head is the bread winner. For a multiple-earner family, the head is the person with the highest income. 6 We use box plot to detect possible outliers in the data of wealth measures and permanent income. We first determine the first and third quartiles (denoted by Q 1 and Q 3 , respectively) for the data set. Define the interquartile range IQR = Q 3 − Q 1 , which is a measure of noise or scale for the data set. Observations that are more than three IQR's are treated as potential outliers and excluded from the sample.
To mitigate potential measurement errors introduced in the process of constructing permanent income, we follow Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) by instrumenting permanent income using education dummies and interactions of education with age and age-squared as instruments in all the regressions.
We consider two types of income uncertainty. The first relates to the cross-sectional variance of the log income used in the literature (Carroll and Samwick, 1998) . Since the average household income in our sample has grown from 1995 to 2002 and different demographic groups might have experienced different growth, directly using the cross-sectional variance of income would be inappropriate, especially for making cross-group comparisons. We thus use a unit-free measure, which is the coefficient of variation (CV) of log income, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of log household head's income over the past six (or five) years as reported in the 1995 (or 2002) CHIP surveys.
The second type of income uncertainty that we consider captures the uncertainty stemming from unemployment risks specific to SOE workers. In particular, we include in the regression an SOE dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the household head works in the SOE sector and zero if the household head works in the GOV sector. If our hypothesis is correct, then we should expect SOE workers to increase their savings relative to GOV workers after the reform took place. We use this source of income uncertainty associated with the largescale SOE reform as the key to identifying precautionary saving.
In our estimation, we control for the effects of a number of demographic characteristics of households, including the household head's age, age-squared, gender, marital status, education, occupation, the household size, status of children (the ages of children, the number of boys, and the number of children at school), health care (public health care, public health insurance, or own payments), home ownership status, and others. Table 2 shows some details of these demographic variables.
We categorize the education level of a household head into four groups: elementary school and below, junior middle school, senior middle school, and post-secondary (college). We take the first group as our reference group and construct four education dummies.
We also divide the occupations of the household heads into five groups: professional, director or manager, skilled or office workers, unskilled or service workers, and others. The group of "others" is our reference group in the regressions.
The health care reform enacted in 1998 significantly changed the share of household expenditures on health care. We categorize the types of health care that the households receive into three groups: public health care (almost free), public health insurance, and self-financing of health care. As shown in To control for the effects of rising education expenditure on households' saving rate, we include in the regressions the mean age of children and the number of children at school.
To control for effects of potential competitive savings motive emphasized in Wei and Zhang (2011) , we add the number of boys among children as an independent variable.
Purchasing a house is argued to be one of the major motives of saving for Chinese households (Wei and Zhang, 2011) . The housing reform that started in 1998 has led to extensively privatized housing market. As shown in Table 2 , the homeownership rate in our sample doubled over the seven year period, from 42.0% in 1995 to 80.4% in 2002. We control for the potential effects of saving for home purchases by including a housing dummy that takes a value of one if the household is a home owner and zero otherwise. We also include in our regressions an interaction term between the SOE dummy and non-homeownership to control for the effects of potential savings by SOE workers for home purchases rather than for precaution against future unemployment risks.
Since the SOE reform and the massive layoffs hit some industries and geographic areas more heavily than others, we include in our regression two dummy variables that indicate the industries and provinces where the household head worked.
As revealed by Table 3 , the reform has impacted GOV workers and SOE workers differently. In 1995, before the reform took place, GOV employees had on average modestly more financial wealth and higher permanent income than SOE workers. They were also more likely to own houses than the SOE workers. Nearly 90% of the GOV jobs were assigned by the government, while 80% of the SOE jobs were assigned by the government. In 2002, after the reform, the wealth and income gaps between the two sectors widened. The homeownership rate rose sharply for both groups (from 45% to 83% for GOV workers and from 40% to 78% for SOE workers). The reform also led to different perceptions of future income across the two groups. In the 2002 survey, about 24% of the SOE workers expected to have declines in income in the next five years, while just a bit over 11% of GOV employees expected income to decline. As we discuss below, pessimistic income outlooks can also raise saving, but such saving behavior represents a desire for intertemporal consumption smoothing (or PIH effects) rather than a motive for precautionary saving. To obtain a clean estimation of precautionary saving, we need to disentangle the PIH effects from the precautionary motive.
IV.3. Empirical Strategies. Following Lusardi (1998) and Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003) , we estimate the importance of precautionary saving using the ratio of financial wealth to permanent income as the dependent variable. The estimation equation for each household i is given by
where W i /P i is the ratio of financial wealth (W i ) to permanent income (P i ), SOE i is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the household head works for an SOE and zero if the household head works for a government or public institution (GOV), RISK i denotes individual income risks measured by the coefficient of variations (CV) of log annual income of the household head for the past 5 or 6 years, Z i is a vector of demographic characteristics,
and v i is the error term.
We choose financial wealth/permanent income (W/P ) ratio as the dependent variable for three reasons. First, precautionary saving model predicts that W/P ratio should be a function of age and other household characteristics (Lusardi, 1998; Carroll and Samwick, 1998) , and therefore using W/P ratio as the dependent variable is consistent with the theoretical framework. Second, as a normalized measure of wealth, W/P ratio makes wealth of households with different income levels comparable. Third, W/P ratio captures a household's cumulative savings, which helps to establish a natural link between wealth accumulation and saving behavior.
As we argue above, the SOE reform in the late 1990s mainly affected the job security for SOE workers, but not for GOV workers. Thus, the reform provides a natural experiment that helps identify changes in precautionary savings for SOE workers relative to GOV workers.
This aspect of the data allows us to use a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to identify changes in the relative precautionary savings across the two sectors before and after the reform.
To implement this idea, we estimate the regression equation (1) Our approach is slightly different from the standard DiD approach, which pools data in all sample years and thus puts an implicit restriction that the coefficients on all variables but the SOE dummy should be identical across time. With our approach, we estimate a separate regression for each of the two sample years and thus we do not impose such restrictions. Since China has gone through large structural changes between 1995 and 2002, many demographic aspects of our sample are likely to have changed during that period.
Thus, taking a more flexible DiD approach as we do here seems appropriate.
To estimate the quantitative importance of precautionary saving, it is necessary to correct a self-selection bias in occupational choices. An individual with high risk aversion has an incentive to choose a job with low income risk. Similarly, a worker with low risk aversion may want to choose a job with high income risk (with potentially high expected income).
Failing to control for self-selection in occupational choice may lead to significant downward bias in estimating the importance of precautionary savings (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005) . We address the self-selection issue by restricting our sample to include only workers whose jobs were assigned by the government. For assigned jobs, the government has the final power to determine the worker's occupation and compensation; and thus, the worker's occupational choice is likely unrelated to her preferences.
The CHIP survey contains a question that asks an interviewee whether his current job was assigned by the government or found through a searching and matching process such as passing an exam, responding to a vacancy post, or referred by friends. We use answers to this question to identify the subsample of workers with government-assigned jobs. As shown in In estimating the model, we also need to address the issue that arises with observations of zero wealth. In our sample, 11.3% of households have zero wealth in 1995 and this share declined to 4.5% in 2002. We treat this issue as a "censored data" problem. We address the issue by estimating an instrumental variable Tobit regression (IV-Tobit). In a robustness check, we also estimate the baseline model in equation (1) by eliminating the zero-wealth observations from our sample and then applying the standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) method (see Section VI.4).
V. Empirical Results
We now discuss the main empirical results and provide evidence of precautionary saving.
We first discuss the estimation results with self-selection corrected in Section V.1. We then examine the quantitative importance of the self-selection bias in Section V.2. Finally, we discuss our approach to disentangling the permanent income effects from precautionary saving in Section V.3.
V.1. Evidence of precautionary saving. We now present evidence of precautionary saving when we correct the self-selection bias by focusing on the subsample with government assigned jobs. The estimation results for 1995 and 2002 are shown in Table 4 (columns (i) and (iii)).
The parameter of interest is the coefficient of the SOE dummy, β 1 , which captures the difference in wealth accumulation between SOE and GOV workers when we control for the effects of all the demographic characteristics in the empirical model described by equation (1).
The estimated value of β 1 is statistically insignificant in 1995 (column (i)), indicating that wealth accumulations of SOE workers and GOV workers were similar in 1995. By 2002, however, SOE workers had accumulated significantly more financial wealth than GOV employees (reflected by a much large estimate of β 1 , see column (iii)). This evidence suggests that the relative saving behaviors of SOE workers has changed during that period. In particular, the difference between the two estimated values of β 1 is large (0.723 − 0.09 = 0.633) and statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.048. The substantial increase in β 1 reflects the effects of the large-scale SOE reform on workers' unemployment risks and thus captures the importance of precautionary saving.
We now discuss the interpretations of estimated coefficients for the control variables. In addition to the demographic controls such as the age, gender and occupation of the household head, we highlight here a few important control variables. These controls include an indicator of idiosyncratic income risks (CV), the permanent income (P) that captures non-homothetic preferences, and additional income or expenditure risks introduced by reforms between 1995 and 2002, such as health care reforms, education reforms, and housing reforms.
We continue to focus on the case with self-selection bias controlled for (columns (i) and (iii) in Table 4 ). The estimated coefficient β 2 of idiosyncratic income risks (CV) is positive and significant at the 1% level for both years. The estimated coefficient β 3 of log(P ) is positive, but it is significant only in 2002, implying a significant income effect for that year.
To control for the impact of health care spending on households' saving behavior, we include in the regression a dummy variable indicating public health care (mostly free) and
another dummy indicating public health insurance. The coefficients of both dummy variables are small and insignificant in 1995 but become significantly negative in 2002. This result is intuitive. In 1995, most workers were covered under a near-free public health care system, so that the health care status did not impose any significant impact on households' saving behavior. However, after the health care reform that started in 1998, a significant fraction of health care spending was shifted to private households. Thus, households not covered by public health care or public health insurance had a strong incentive to save. This finding is consistent with that obtained by Chamon and Prasad (2010) , who report that declining public provisions of health care in the late 1990s in China created strong motives for precautionary saving against potential health expenditure shocks.
To control for the effects of education reforms on households' saving behavior and potential competitive saving motive in the marriage market emphasized by Wei and Zhang (2011) , we include in our regression three additional variables: the mean age of children, the number of children enrolled in schools, and the number of boys in each household. Our estimation shows that the mean age of children does not explain wealth accumulation. The number of children enrolled in schools tends to reduce wealth accumulation in both years, although the effects were significant only in 2002. Having more children at school requires more expenditure on education after the education reforms in the late 1990s, which led to lower disposable income and reduced wealth accumulation. The number of boys contributes positively to savings in 1995, consistent with the findings in Wei and Zhang (2011) , although the estimated coefficient is insignificant for that year. In 2002, however, having more boys in the household actually reduced savings and the effect is significant at the 10% confidence level. A possible explanation lies in the reforms of social security and the pension system, which substantially weakened the public safety net for retirees. In the Chinese culture, sons are supposed to take responsibility of taking care their elderly parents. Therefore, facing an uncertain future of safety net, having more boys means having better insurance for their parents. Parents thus do not need to save that much for their old-age consumption. In our 2002 sample, this self-insurance effect of having more boys dominates the potential competitive savings motive highlighted by Wei and Zhang (2011) .
Finally, to control for the effects of housing reform on saving, we include in the regression a home ownership dummy and an interaction term between a non-homeowner dummy and the SOE dummy. The coefficients for these two variables are not significant for both years.
A possible explanation is that, in 2002, the housing market was not fully developed and home purchases were still heavily subsidized. This result indicates that the saving motive for home purchases was weak in both 1995 and 2002.
V.2. The self-selection bias. The literature shows that self-selection in occupational choices can lead to a substantial downward bias in the estimated magnitude of precautionary saving (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005 ). An individual with high risk aversion has an incentive to choose a job with low income risk. Similarly, a worker with low risk aversion may want to choose a job with high income risk (with potentially high expected income). To correct the downward bias caused by self-selection, we restrict our sample to workers whose jobs were assigned by the government. To the extent that the government's job assignments are not systematically correlated with individual risk attitude, our sample restriction should mitigate the bias caused by self-selection in occupational choices.
Our estimation shows that the downward bias caused by self-selection was not statistically significant in 1995, but it became significant in 2002. This can be seen by comparing the estimated value of β 1 from the subsample with government-assigned jobs to the estimate obtained from the full sample (i.e., the difference between β 1 in columns (i) V.3. Disentangling PIH Effects from Precautionary Saving. The large-scale SOE reform not only led to significant changes in the relative job security between GOV and SOE workers, they might also produce potentially large differences in future income expectations between the two groups. All else equal, a worker who expects declines in future income would like to increase saving, but such increases in saving reflects a desire for intertemporal consumption smoothing (i.e., a permanent income effect) rather than a motive of precautionary saving. To the extent that the difference in perceived job security and income expectations between the two groups of workers were both caused by the SOE reform, disentangling the PIH effect from precautionary saving is particularly important for the post-reform period in
2002.
To isolate the effects of precautionary motives on saving from the PIH effects, we use a unique question in the 2002 CHIP survey that asks households about their expectations of income paths for the next five years. As Table 3 shows, a significant fraction of SOE workers surveyed in 2002 expected future income declines (23.8%), although a much smaller fraction of GOV workers expected income declines (11.4%). Thus, the reform has caused different income expectations in addition to different unemployment risks across the two groups of workers.
We disentangle the PIH effects from the precautionary motive on saving, we separate the sample of SOE workers in the 2002 survey into two groups based on their reported expectations of future income. One group expected income declines in the next five years, 8 The dependent variable (W/P ) is the ratio of financial wealth to annual permanent income. A value of W/P = 0.4, for example, is equivalent to 0.4 * 12 ≈ 5 months of permanent income. and the other group expected non-declines. We run IV-Tobit 2SLS regressions based on the empirical model in equation (1) for each group of the SOE workers in 2002, using all GOV workers in that year as the control group.
The estimation results are reported in Table 5 . The first column shows the estimation results for the group of SOE workers who expected their income to decline. The second column shows the results for the group that did not expect their income to decline. In both cases, we restrict our sample to those workers whose jobs were assigned by the government to control for the self-selection bias.
Our parameter of interest is again β 1 , the coefficient of the SOE dummy. For the group of SOE workers who expected their income to decline, the estimated value of β 1 ( (Carroll and Samwick, 1998; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005) to quantify the contributions of precautionary saving to wealth accumulation. The idea is to compute the difference between (1) the model's predicted change in financial wealth held by SOE workers from 1995 to 2002 and (2) the counterfactual change 9 Using the group of SOE workers that did not expect their income to decline in the 2002 survey might cause a downward bias in estimating precautionary saving, for two reasons. First, we do not exclude workers who expected their future income to rise; whereas for this group, the PIH channel should induce them to save less. Second, workers who expected their future income to fall might be the group who also faced higher probability of being laid-off and thus higher future income uncertainty; these workers might have stronger motives for precautionary saving than the group who expected their income not to decline.
in financial wealth had SOE workers enjoyed the same job security as GOV workers before and after the reform.
To implement this idea, we go through the following steps. First, we calculate the model's predicted wealth held by SOE workers in 1995 (denote this byŴ soe 1995 ) using the benchmark estimation results reported in column (i) of Table 4 , where we have corrected the self-selection bias related to occupational choice. Second, we calculate the predicted wealth held by SOE workers in 2002 (denote this byŴ soe 2002 ) using the estimation results reported in column (ii) of Table 5 , where we have controlled for both the self-selection bias and the PIH effects.
Third, we compute the counterfactual wealth holdings by SOE workers in each year of the surveys by assuming that those workers had the same job security as GOV employees, while keeping all the other characteristics unchanged. In particular, we use the same estimated coefficients as in the first two steps, except that we replace the estimated value of β 1 by zero (and thus assuming the SOE dummy did not affect the wealth accumulation at all). Denote 
where W P S denotes the wealth accumulation from precautionary savings. The ratio
then measures the fraction of the (model-predicted) changes in financial wealth held by the SOE workers that can be accounted for by precautionary saving.
Our estimation implies that precautionary saving accounts for 30.3% of financial wealth accumulation for SOE workers between 1995 and 2002, which is statistically significant with a standard error of 0.166. This result suggests that the SOE reform in the late 1990s have led to quantitatively important precautionary savings.
VI. Robustness
We have presented evidence that increases in unemployment risks for SOE workers relative to GOV workers following the large-scale SOE reform in China have led to substantial increases in precautionary saving for the SOE workers. Our estimation suggests that such saving behavior accounts for about 30% of the cumulative increase in financial wealth held by SOE workers from 1995 to 2002. In our estimation, we have exploited the micro-level details of our dataset to control for self-selection biases and to disentangle PHI effects from precautionary saving.
We now examine the robustness of our results by running a few more experiments. In each experiment, we focus on the sample with all workers' jobs assigned by the government so that we can control for self-selection biases. We also remove those SOE workers in the 2002 sample who expected their incomes to decline in the next five years so that we can control for PIH effects.
VI.1. Pension effects. Pension benefits can also affect saving behaviors through a channel similar to that of income expectations: they both reflect PIH effects. To get a clean estimate of precautionary saving, we would also need to take into account of pension effects. Unfortunately, our dataset does not provide direct pension information at the individual household level. However, we do observe average pension benefits for SOE workers and GOV employees in both 1995 and 2002. We use these aggregate observations to obtain a rough estimate of the extent to which differences in pension benefits across the two sectors and the changes of The PIH hypothesis implies that, all else equal, a worker with lower pension benefits should save more, although such saving behavior reflects a desire for intertemporal consumption smoothing (i.e., a wealth effect), which is different from precautionary saving. To adjust for the pension effects in our estimation of precautionary saving, we assume that the positive estimated value of β 1 = 0.090 in 1995 reflects mainly the lower pension benefits for SOE workers than for GOV workers. This assumption seems reasonable because, in our regression,
we have controlled for all other demographic characteristics for both groups of workers. By VI.2. Size effects. The SOE reform in the late 1990s had very different impact on large SOE firms than on medium and small firms. The spirit of the reform was to "Grasp the Large and Let Go of the Small." Accordingly, large and profitable SOEs in strategically important sectors (such as oil, electricity, and telecommunications) were corporatized or consolidated into large state-owned conglomerates, while smaller and loss-making SOE firms were shut down or privatized (Hsieh and Song, 2013) . Those large SOEs that survived the reorganization typically gained stronger government protections of their monopoly power, leading to higher profits than their privatized counterparts (Li, Liu, and Wang, 2012) . Thus, our higher estimate of β 1 in 2002 than in 1995 might reflect partly the fact that workers in large and surviving SOEs were richer, which is not the same as precautionary saving.
To address this concern, we divide SOEs in our sample into two groups based on their sizes: central or provincial SOEs (CSOE) vs. local SOEs (LSOE). 10 CSOEs are typically larger than LSOEs, and workers in CSOEs typically face a lower unemployment risks than those in LSOEs (Appleton, Knight, Song, and Xia, 2002) . 11 Therefore, we should expect to see higher precautionary saving motives for LSOE workers than for CSOE workers.
To examine the importance of this size effect, we modify the benchmark model in equation (1) by replacing the SOE dummy variable with the two dummy variables, indicating whether the household head worked in a CSOE or an LSOE. The regression model is now
where CSOE i and LSOE i are the two dummy variables indicating the type of the SOE firm in which the household head i worked. was estimated to be 0.160 and in significant in 1995, but it rose sharply to 1.082 in 2002 and became significant, with the p-value of 0.046 for the Chow test. This finding is consistent with the view that workers in LSOEs had stronger precautionary saving motives than those in CSOEs because they faced higher unemployment risks.
VI.3. Survival Bias. To obtain a clean identification of precautionary saving caused by the SOE reform, we need to control the characteristics of SOE workers before and after the reform. In particular, in the 2002 sample, we should include workers who share the same characteristics as those in the 1995 sample except that they face higher unemployment risks. There is evidence that workers with lower educational attainment or lower skills had a higher chance of being laid off (Appleton, Knight, Song, and Xia, 2002) . Therefore, it is plausible that the SOE workers in the 2002 sample who survived the layoffs had on average 10 LSOE also includes urban collective enterprises. 11 In the 2002 sample, only 3.4% of workers in CSOEs had experience of prior layoffs, while 7.4% of workers in local SOE and 16.4% workers in urban collective enterprises experienced layoffs.
higher skills and thus higher income, which may affect their saving behavior and thus create a survival bias in the estimation of precautionary saving.
To correct the survival bias, we use a propensity score approach to adjust the 1995 sample to include only those workers who are likely to survive the massive layoffs. We estimate the probability of being laid off for a SOE worker in 1995 based on the 2002 sample, extended to include also those workers who had worked in the SOE sector but had experienced layoffs between 1995 and 2002. We use the extended 2002 sample to estimate the Probit model
where Z i is the individual i's characteristics, such as age, gender, education levels, occupation, and industry and province dummies. The dependent variable in the Probit model is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if an individual had prior or current layoff experience, and equals zero otherwise.
Based on the estimated probability of being laid off as a function of individual characteristics using the extended 2002 sample, we go back to use the 1995 sample to predict each SOE worker's probability of being laid-off conditional on their characteristics.
According to Giles, Park, and Zhang (2005) to survive the massive layoffs. We argue that the subsample of potential survivors of the layoffs in 1995 share similar characteristics with the 2002 sample (who are ex post survivors of the layoffs), except that they face different levels of unemployment risks. Table 7 shows the estimated results of equation (1) when the survival bias is corrected.
Column (1) keeps all workers in 1995 sample and therefore simply replicates the results in column (i) of Table 4 . Column (2) Thus, excluding zero-wealth observations from the sample tends to reduce the estimated magnitude of precautionary saving. Nonetheless, the estimated difference between β 1 in 1995 and 2002 remains significant, suggesting evidence of precautionary saving stemming from increased unemployment risks for SOE workers following the reform.
VI.5. Conventional Risk Measure. So far we keep using CV (ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) of the logarithm of a household head's labor income over the past five or six years to measure idiosyncratic income risk. An alternative measure of risk, which is also widely used in the literature, is the variance of the logarithm of permanent income (Carroll and Samwick, 1998; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005) . In this subsection, we check the sensitivity of our results to this conventional risk measure. More specifically, we follow Carroll and Samwick (1998) to divide our data sample into 20 subsamples corresponding to the five occupation categories and four education groups (see Table 1 ) in both years. For each household, we calculate the log variance of log of annual income with respect to the mean income within the group that it belongs to. We use this within-group variance of income to proxy risk. The results are shown in panel B of Table 8 .
As we can see from the (Carroll and Samwick, 1998) . We shall check the sensitivity of our empirical results to these alternative measures of wealth (see Table 1 for the construction of these variables in CHIP). 12
Panel C of Table 8 presents the results using very liquid assets as wealth measure to construct the dependent variable in equation (1). The estimated value of β 1 increases from 0.062 (not significant) in 1995 to 0.439 (significant at 10% level) in 2002. Panel D of Table   8 shows the results employing non-housing non-business wealth to construct the dependent variable in (1). The estimated value of β 1 is 0.210 and insignificant in 1995 and it increases substantially to 0.632 (significant at 10% level) in 2002, which are similar to the benchmark estimates.
In summary, we find that using alternative wealth measures does not significantly affect our main result.
VII. Conclusion
Using 
